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Abstract 
This paper examines optimal monetary policy in an open-economy two-country 
model with sticky prices. Currency misalignments are shown to be inefficient and 
lower world welfare. Also, optimal policy must target not only inflation and the 
output gap, but also the currency misalignment. However, the interest rate reaction 
function that supports this targeting rule involves only the CPI inflation rate. This 
result illustrates how examination of ‘instrument rules’ may hide important trade-
offs facing policy-makers that are incorporated in ‘targeting rules’. The model is a 
modified version of Clarida, Galí and Gertler’s (2002). The key change is to allow 
pricing to market or local-currency pricing and consider the policy implications of 
currency misalignments. Besides highlighting the importance of the currency 
misalignment, this model also gives a rationale for targeting CPI inflation, rather 
than producer price inflation as in Clarida, Galí and Gertler. 
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1.  Introduction 
Exchange rates among the large economies have fluctuated dramatically over the 
past 30 years. The euro/US dollar exchange rate has experienced swings of greater 
than 60 per cent, and even the Canadian dollar/US dollar has risen and fallen by 
more than 35 per cent in the past decade, but inflation rates in these economies 
have differed by only a few percentage points per year. Should these exchange rate 
movements be a concern for policy-makers? Would it not be better for policy-
makers to focus on output and inflation and ignore a freely floating exchange rate 
that settles at a market-determined level? 
It is widely understood that purchasing power parity does not hold in the short run. 
Empirical evidence points to the possibility of ‘local-currency pricing’ (LCP) or 
‘pricing to market’.1 That is, exporting firms may price discriminate among 
markets and/or set prices in the buyers’ currencies. A currency could be overvalued 
if the consumer price level is higher at home than abroad when compared in a 
common currency, or undervalued if the relative price level is lower at home. 
Currency misalignments can be very large even in advanced economies.  
There is frequent public discussion of the importance of controlling currency 
misalignments. For example, on 3 November 2008, Robert Rubin (former US 
Secretary of the Treasury) and Jared Bernstein (of the Economic Policy Institute) 
co-authored an op-ed piece in the New York Times that argued, ‘Public policy … 
has been seriously deficient [because of] false choices, grounded in ideology’ 
(Rubin and Bernstein 2008). One of the principles they argue that all should agree 
upon is ‘we need to work with other countries toward equilibrium exchange rates’. 
Yet there is little support in the modern New Keynesian literature on monetary 
                                           
1  Many studies have found evidence of violations of the law of one price for consumer prices. 
Two prominent studies are Engel (1999) and Atkeson and Burstein (2008). The literature is 
voluminous – these two papers contain many relevant citations. 2 
policy for the notion that central banks should target exchange rates. Specifically, 
if policy-makers are already optimally responding to inflation and the output gap, 
is there any reason to pay attention to exchange rate misalignments? 
The answer is yes. In a simple, familiar framework, this paper draws out the 
implications for monetary policy when currency misalignments are possible. 
Currency misalignments lead to inefficient allocations for reasons that are 
analogous to the problems with inflation in a world of staggered price setting. 
When there are currency misalignments, households in the home and foreign 
countries may pay different prices for an identical good. A basic tenet of 
economics is that violations of the law of one price are inefficient – if the good’s 
marginal cost is the same irrespective of where the good is sold, it is not efficient 
to sell the good at different prices. The key finding of this paper is that currency 
misalignments lead to a reduction in world welfare and that optimal monetary 
policy trades off this currency misalignment with inflation and output goals. 
These currency misalignments arise even when foreign exchange markets are 
efficient. That is, the currency misalignment distortion that is a concern to policy-
makers arises in the goods market – from price setting – and not in the foreign 
exchange market. In the model of this paper, the foreign exchange rate is 
determined in an efficient currency market as a function of fundamental economic 
variables. 
The literature has indeed previously considered models with LCP. Some of these 
models are much richer than the model considered here. To understand the 
contribution of this paper, it is helpful to place it relative to four sets of papers: 
1. Clarida  et al (2002, hereafter referred to as CGG) develop what is probably 
the canonical model for open-economy monetary policy analysis in the New 
Keynesian framework. Their paper assumes that firms set prices in the 
producer’s currency (PCP, for ‘producer-currency pricing’). Their two-
country model also assumes that home and foreign households have identical 
preferences. These two assumptions lead to the conclusion that purchasing 
 3 
power parity (PPP) holds at all times – the consumption real exchange rate is 
constant.2 
This paper introduces LCP into CGG’s model. Simple rules for monetary 
policy are derived that are similar to CGG’s. While the model is not rich 
relative to sophisticated models in the literature (models that introduce 
capital, working capital, capacity utilisation, habits in preferences, etc), the 
simple model is helpful for developing intuition because the model can be 
solved analytically, an explicit second-order approximation to the policy-
maker’s loss function can be derived, as can explicit ‘target criteria’ for policy 
and explicit interest rate reaction functions. As I shall quickly explain, a lot 
can be learned from these relationships in the simple model. 
The paper also allows home and foreign households to have different 
preferences. They can exhibit a home bias in preferences – a larger weight on 
goods produced in a household’s country of residence.3 This generalisation 
does not change the optimal target criteria at all in the CGG framework, but 
as I now explain, is helpful in developing a realistic LCP model. 
2.  Devereux and Engel (2003) explicitly examine optimal monetary policy in a 
two-country framework with LCP. Corsetti and Pesenti (2005) extend the 
analysis in several directions. However, neither of these studies is suited 
toward answering the question posed above: is currency misalignment a 
separate concern of monetary policy, or will the optimal exchange rate 
behaviour be achieved through a policy that considers inflation and the output 
gap? 
                                           
2  Benigno and Benigno (2003, 2006) are important contributions that use models similar to 
CGG’s but consider optimal policy when the optimal subsidies to deal with monopoly 
distortions are not present in steady state. 
3  De Paoli (2009) allows for home bias in preferences in a small open economy model. There is 
home bias in the sense that while the country is small, the limit of the ratio of the expenditure 
share on home goods to the population share is not equal to one. Faia and Monacelli (2008) 
examine optimal monetary policy in a small open economy model with home bias, using a 
Ramsey-style analysis. Pappa (2004) considers a two-country model with home bias. 
However, the second-order approximation to the welfare function is expressed in terms of 
deviations of consumption from its efficient level, rather than in terms of the output gap, so 
the analysis is not strictly comparable to that here. See Woodford (2003) for a discussion of 
why it makes sense to approximate in terms of the output gap rather than consumption. 
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These models have a couple of crucial assumptions that make them unsuited 
to answering this question. First, like CGG, they assume identical preferences 
in both countries. This assumption (as shown below) leads to the outcome that 
currency misalignments are the only source of CPI inflation differences 
between the two countries in the LCP framework. Eliminating inflation 
differences eliminates currency misalignments and vice versa.4  
Second, price stickiness is the only distortion in the economy in these papers. 
In contrast, CGG introduce ‘cost-push shocks’, so that policy-makers face a 
trade-off between the goals for inflation and the output gap. In Devereux and 
Engel, the optimal monetary policy under LCP sets inflation to zero in each 
country, thus eliminating any currency misalignment. 
By introducing home bias in preferences, the tight link between relative 
inflation rates and currency misalignments is broken. A more realistic model 
for inflation results when relative CPI inflation rates depend not only on 
currency misalignments, but also on the internal relative price of imported to 
domestically produced goods. Moreover, we follow CGG in allowing for 
cost-push shocks.5 
This paper also derives optimal policy in a framework that is consonant with 
the bulk of New Keynesian models of monetary policy analysis. Devereux 
and Engel (2003) and Corsetti and Pesenti (2005) assume price setting is 
synchronised, with prices set one period in advance.6 Here the standard Calvo 
price-setting technology is adopted, which allows for asynchronised price 
setting. This change is important, because it emphasises the point that the cost 
of inflation under sticky prices is misaligned relative prices. Also, the 
                                           
4  See Duarte and Obstfeld (2008), who emphasise this point. 
5  The contribution of Sutherland (2005) merits attention. His two-country model allows for 
imperfect pass-through, and for differences in home and foreign preferences. His model is 
static, and he derives a welfare function in which the variance of the exchange rate appears. 
However, the other terms in the welfare function are prices, so it is not clear how this function 
relates to standard quadratic approximations that involve output gaps and inflation levels. 
Moreover, Sutherland does not derive optimal monetary policy in his framework. 
6  A sophisticated extension of this work is the recent paper by Corsetti, Dedola and 
Leduc  (forthcoming). That paper extends earlier work in several dimensions, including 
staggered price setting. But it does not directly address the issue of whether currency 
misalignments belong in the targeting rule along with output gaps and inflation. 
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previous papers assumed that the money supply was the instrument of 
monetary policy. This paper follows CGG and most of the modern literature 
in assuming that the policy-makers directly control the nominal interest rate in 
each country.7 
3.  Monacelli (2005) has considered optimal monetary policy under LCP in a 
simple small country model.8 But a small country model is not capable of 
addressing the global misallocation of resources arising from violations of the 
law of one price. In such a model, import prices are exogenous for the home 
country, and the welfare of the rest of the world is ignored. Hence, such a 
framework is not designed to consider the problems of currency 
misalignments. 
4.  There are many papers that numerically solve very rich open economy models 
and examine optimal policy. Some of these papers allow for LCP. Many of 
those papers are in the framework of a small open economy, and so do not 
specifically account for the global misallocation of resources that occurs with 
currency misalignments.9 Moreover, many use ad hoc welfare criteria for the 
policy-maker or approximations that are not strictly derived from household 
welfare.10 
Some papers have considered whether it is beneficial to augment the interest 
rate reaction function of central banks with an exchange rate variable.11 They 
ask the question: if the Taylor rule has the interest rate reacting to inflation 
and the output gap, is there any gain from adding the exchange rate? 
                                           
7  While the model of this paper adheres strictly to the set-up of CGG, changing only the 
assumptions of identical preferences and LCP instead of PCP price setting, the model is very 
similar to that of Benigno’s (2004). Woodford (forthcoming) also considers the LCP version 
of CGG (though not for optimal monetary policy analysis) and makes the connection to 
Benigno’s paper. 
8  See also Leith and Wren-Lewis (2007) who examine a small open economy model with non-
traded goods (but with PCP for export pricing). 
9  See, for example, Kollmann (2002), Smets and Wouters (2002), Ambler, Dib and 
Rebei (2004) and Adolfson et al (2008). 
10 For example, Smets and Wouters (2002), Ambler et al (2004) and Adolfson et al (2008). 
11 In a small open economy, see Kollmann (2002) and Leitemo and Söderström (2005). In a 
two-country model, see Wang (forthcoming).  
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Typically these studies find little or no evidence of welfare gains from adding 
the exchange rate to the Taylor rule. 
The question posed this way is misleading. To understand this point, it is helpful 
first to return to the optimal policy analysis in CGG. That paper finds (under their 
assumption of PCP) that optimal monetary policy can be characterised by a pair of 
‘target criteria’ or ‘targeting rules’:  0 tH t y ξπ + =   and 
** 0 tF t y ξπ + =  . In these 
equations,   refers to the output gap of the home country – the percentage 
difference between the actual output level and its efficient level. 
t y 
Ht π  is producer 




Ft π  is foreign producer price inflation.12 These equations describe the optimal 
trade-off between the output gap and inflation for the policy-maker. It will be 
desirable to allow inflation to be positive if the output gap is negative, for example. 
CGG then derive optimal interest rate rules that will deliver these optimal policy 
trade-offs. They find that the optimal interest rate reaction functions (assuming 
discretionary policy) are:  t tH t
* **
t tF t rb rr rr rb π =+  and  π =+ .   is the home nominal 
interest rate, and 
t r
t rr is the ‘Wicksellian’ or efficient real interest rate. The response 
of the interest rate to inflation, b, is a function of model parameters.13  
The key point to be made here is that CGG’s model shows that optimal policy 
must trade off the inflation and output goals of the central bank. But the optimal 
interest rate reaction function does not necessarily include the output gap. That is, 
adding the output gap to the interest rate rule that already includes inflation will 
not improve welfare. Focusing on the ‘instrument rule’ does not reveal the role of 
the output gap that is apparent in the ‘targeting rule’ in the terminology of 
Svensson (1999, 2002). 
An analogous situation arises in the LCP model concerning currency 
misalignments. We can characterise the ‘target criteria’ in this model with two 
rules, as in the CGG model. The first is 
** () tt tt yyξπ π 0 + ++ =  . This rule, at first 
glance, appears to be simply the sum of the two ‘target criteria’ in the CGG model. 
It is, except that the inflation rates that appear in this trade-off ( t π  and 
*
t π ) are 
based on the CPI, rather than the producer price index (PPI) as in CGG’s model. 
                                           
12  ξ  is a preference parameter defined below. 
13 Specifically, I show below that  (1 ) b ρ ρσ ξ =+− ; parameters are defined below. 
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The second target criterion is 
* 1
() tt t q ξπ π
σ
0 + −=  , where   is the real exchange 
rate (defined as foreign prices relative to home prices expressed in a common 
currency) and   is the deviation of the real exchange rate from its efficient level. 
(The parameters in this equation are defined below.) The important point is that the 
trade-off described here relates real exchange rates and relative CPI inflation rates. 
For example, even if inflation is low in the home country relative to the foreign 
country, optimal policy may, under some circumstances, still call for a tightening 




Like CGG, the optimal interest rate rules that support these targeting rules can be 
derived. These interest rate reaction functions are  t tt rr rb π =+ and 
* **
t tt rr rb π =+. 
They are identical to the ones derived in CGG (the parameter b is the same), except 
they target CPI inflation rather than PPI inflation as in CGG. The conclusion is that 
while the target criteria include currency misalignments, the currency 
misalignment is not in the optimal interest rate reaction function. If we focus on 
only the latter, we miss this trade-off the policy-maker faces. 
Previous studies have found little welfare gain from adding an exchange rate 
variable to the Taylor rule. Properly speaking, these studies examine the effects of 
simple targeting rules under commitment. My results describe the welfare function, 
the target criteria and the optimal interest rate reaction functions under 
discretionary policy-making. But the results here suggest that even if there is no 
role for the currency misalignment in a simple targeting rule, exchange rate 
concerns may still be important in terms of welfare. This point is brought out in the 
context of a relatively simple model that can be solved analytically (with 
approximations), but is obscured in larger models that are solved numerically.14 
The paper proceeds in two steps. After setting out the objectives of households and 
firms, the production functions, and the market structure, a global loss function for 
cooperative monetary policy-makers is derived. The period loss function can be 
derived without making any assumptions about how goods prices or wages are 
                                           
14 Coenen et al (2008) examine optimal monetary policy in a two-country model that exhibits 
incomplete pass-through. However, the numerical analysis does not allow the reader to see 
explicitly the role of currency misalignments. 
 8 
set.15 I find that in addition to squares and cross-products of home and foreign 
output gaps, and the cross-sectional dispersion of goods prices within each country, 
the loss also depends on the squared currency misalignment. This loss function 
evaluates the welfare costs arising because firms set different prices in the home 
and foreign countries (assuming that the costs of selling the good in both countries 
are identical), and does not depend on whether the price differences arise from 
local-currency price stickiness, from price discrimination, or for some other reason. 
The paper then follows CGG and assumes a Calvo mechanism for price setting. 
However, allowance is made for the possibility of LCP. As in CGG, optimal policy 
under discretion is derived. Both targeting rules and instrument rules are obtained. 
Only optimal cooperative policy is considered. The goal is to quantify the global 
loss from currency misalignments, which can be seen by deriving the loss function 
for a policy-maker that aims to maximise the sum of utilities of home and foreign 
households. Practically speaking, international agreements that prohibit currency 
manipulation may mean that the currency misalignment can only be addressed in a 
cooperative environment.16 That is, it seems likely that if central banks are going 
to move toward policies that explicitly target exchange rates, they will do so 
cooperatively. 
2.  The Model 
The model is nearly identical to CGG’s. It is based on two countries of equal size, 
while CGG allow the population of the countries to be different. Since the 
population size plays no real role in their analysis, the model here is simplified 
along this dimension. But two significant generalisations are made. The first is to 
allow for different preferences in the two countries. Home agents may derive 




 on home goods and 1
2
ν
−  on foreign goods (and vice versa for foreign 
                                           
15 Except that I do assume that all households (which are identical) set the same wage. As I note 
later, this rules out a model of staggered wage setting such as in Erceg, Henderson and 
Levin (2000), though a generalisation to encompass that case would be straightforward. 
16 For example, under the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO), countries may not 
deliberately devalue their currencies. 
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households.) This is a popular assumption in the open economy macroeconomics 
literature, and can be considered as a shortcut for modelling ‘openness’. That is, a 
less open economy puts less weight on consumption of imported goods, and in the 
limit the economy becomes closed if it imports no goods. The second major 
change, as already noted, is to allow for goods to be sold at different prices in the 
home and foreign countries. 
The model assumes two countries, each inhabited with a continuum of households, 
normalised to a total of one in each country. Households have utility over 
consumption of goods and disutility from provision of labour services. In each 
country, there is a continuum of goods produced, each by a monopolist. 
Households supply labour to firms located within their own country, and get utility 
from all goods produced in both countries. Each household is a monopolistic 
supplier of a unique type of labour to firms within its country. Trade in a complete 
set of nominally denominated contingent claims is assumed. 
Monopolistic firms produce output using only labour, subject to technology 
shocks.  
In this section, no assumptions are made about how wages are set by monopolistic 
households or prices are set by monopolistic firms. In particular, prices and wages 
may be sticky, and there may be LCP or PCP for firms. The period loss function is 
derived for the policy-maker, which expresses the loss (relative to the efficient 
outcome) in terms of within-country and international price misalignments and 
output gaps. This loss function applies under various assumptions about how prices 
are actually set, and so is more general than the policy rules subsequently derived 
which depend on the specific nature of price and wage setting. 
All households within a country are identical. It is assumed that in each period 
their labour supplies are identical. This assumption rules out staggered wage 
setting as in Erceg et al (2000), because in that model there will be dispersion in 
labour input across households that arises from the dispersion in wages. The set-up 
is consistent with sticky wages, but not wage dispersion. However, it is entirely 
straightforward to generalise the loss functions derived to allow for wage 
dispersion following the steps in Erceg et al. This is not done so that the model is 
more directly comparable to CGG. 
 10 
2.1  Households 








tt t j t j
j








=− ⎨⎬ ⎢⎥ −+ ⎣⎦ ⎩⎭ ∑ 0, 0 , σ φ >≥  (1) 
() t Ch is the consumption aggregate. We assume Cobb-Douglas preferences: 
  () ()
1
22 () () () tH tF t Ch C h C h
ν ν
−
= , 0 2 ν ≤ ≤ . (2) 
If 1 ν = , home and foreign preferences are identical as in CGG. There is home bias 
in preferences when  1 ν > .  
In turn,   and   are CES aggregates over a continuum of goods 
produced in each country: 
() Ht Ch () Ft Ch
  ()
1 1 1




− − ⎛⎞ =⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ∫  and  ()
1 1 1




− − ⎛⎞ =⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ∫ . (3) 
() t Nh  is an aggregate of the labour services that the household sells to each of a 
continuum of firms located in the home country: 
  . (4) 
1
0 () (, ) tt Nh Nhfd f =∫
Households receive wage income,  , and aggregate profits from home 
firms,  . They pay lump-sum taxes each period,  . Each household can trade in 
a complete market in contingent claims (arbitrarily) denominated in the home 
currency. The budget constraint is given by: 
() () tt WhNh
t Γ t T
  , (5) 




tt t t t t
s





+∇ ∇∇ = + − + ∑
t ∇
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where   represents household h’s pay-offs on state-contingent claims for 







t 1 t+ ∇ , 
conditional on state 
t ∇  occurring at time t. 
In this equation,   is the exact price index for consumption, given by:  t P
  , 
1/ 2 1 ( / 2
tH t F t Pk PP
νν −− =
) 1(/ 2 ) / 2 (1 ( / 2)) ( / 2) k
ν ν νν
− =− . (6) 
Ht P  is the home-currency price of the home aggregate good and  Ft P  is the home-
currency price of the foreign aggregate good. Equation (6) follows from cost 
minimisation. Also, from cost minimisation,  Ht P  and  Ft P  are the usual CES 
aggregates over prices of individual varieties, f: 
  ( )
1
1 1
0 () Ht Ht PP f d f
ξ ξ − 1− = ∫ , and  ( )
1
1 1
0 () Ft Ft PP f d f
ξ ξ − 1− = ∫ . (7) 
Foreign households have analogous preferences and face an analogous budget 
constraint. 
Because all home households are identical, we can drop the index for the 
household and use the fact that aggregate per capita consumption of each good is 
equal to the consumption of each good by each household. The first-order 
conditions for consumption are given by:  
 
2
Ht Ht t t PC P C
ν
= , (8) 
  1
2
FtF t tt PC P C





() a n d () ,
Ht Ft
HtH t F t
Ht Ft
Pf Pf






F t  (10) 
  ( )
1
1 () / ( ) ( /)(|
tt t




+ ∇∇ = ∇  1 )
t + ∇ . (11) 
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In Equation (11), an index for the state at time t is made explicit for the purpose of 
clarity.   is the normalised price of the state-contingent claim. That is, it 
is defined as   divided by the probability of state   conditional on 
state  . 
1 (|
t Z











Note that the sum of   across all possible states at time t + 1 must equal 
, where   denotes the gross nominal yield on a one-period non-state-





1/ t R t R
(11), we have the familiar Euler equation: 
  ( )
1
1 () / ( ) ( /)
tt




+ ⎡ ∇∇ ⎢ ⎣




Analogous equations hold for foreign households. Since contingent claims are 
(arbitrarily) denominated in home currency, the first-order condition for foreign 
households that is analogous to Equation (11) is: 
  . (13)  ()
*1 * * * 1
11 () / ( ) ( / )(|
tt t




++ ∇∇ = ∇ 
Following the unfortunate notation of CGG,  t E  is the nominal exchange rate, 
defined as the home-currency price of foreign currency, and should not be 
mistaken for the conditional expectations operator. As noted above, at this stage 
the labour input of all households is assumed to be the same, so  .  () tt NN h =
2.2  Firms 
Each home good,   is made by firm f according to a production function that is 
linear in the labour input. These are given by: 
() t Yf
  () () tt t Yf A Nf = . (14) 
Note that the productivity shock,  t A , is common to all firms in the home country. 

















⎝⎠ ∫ ⎟ ⎟
, (15) 
where the technology parameter,  t η , is stochastic and common to all home firms.  
Profits are given by: 
 
** () () () () ()( 1 ) () tH t H tt H t H t t t t f Pf Cf E Pf Cf W N f Γτ =+ − − . (16) 
In this equation,   is the home-currency price of the good when it is sold in 
the home country and   is the foreign-currency price of the good when it is 
sold in the foreign country.   is aggregate sales of the good in the home 
country: 
() Ht Pf
* () Ht Pf
() Ht Cf
  . (17) 
1
0 () ( ,) Ht Ht Cf Ch f d =∫ h
Sales of the same good in the foreign country,  , is defined analogously. It 
follows that  . The subsidy for using labour is 
* () Ht Cf
* () () () tH tH t Yf C f C f =+ t τ .  




t A , the foreign technology parameter shock given by 
*
t η , and foreign 
subsidy given by 
*
t τ . 
2.3  Equilibrium 
Goods market-clearing conditions in the home and foreign countries are given by: 
**




tH tH t t t t t
Ht Ht
PC P C
YC C k S C S C
PP
νν νν ν ν −− − ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ =+= + − = + − ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
* / 2 * ( ) , (18) 
**
* * 1 * 1 ( /2) * /2
* 1( ) 1
22 2 2
tt t t
tF t F t t t t t
Ft Ft
PC P C
YCC k S C SC
PP
νν νν ν ν −− − ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ =+= − + = + − ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
. (19) 
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t S  and   are used to represent the price of imported goods relative to locally 
produced goods in the home and foreign countries, respectively (the inverse of the 
standard definition for the terms of trade): 
*
t S
  / tF t SPP H t = , (20) 
  . (21) 
** / tH t SPP =
*
F t
Equations (11) and (13) provide the familiar condition that arises in open economy 
models with a complete set of state-contingent claims when PPP does not hold: 
 
**
*/ 2 ( / 2 )
* ()
tt t t H t
tt
tt H t








This condition equates the marginal rate value of a dollar for home and foreign 
households, in terms of its purchasing power over aggregate consumption in each 
country. 
Total employment is determined by output in each industry: 
  ( )
11 11
00 () () t t t t t H tH t H tH t NN f d f A Y f d f A C V C V
−− == = + ∫∫


























⎝⎠ ∫ V . (24) 
3.  Log-linearised Model 
This section presents some log-linear approximations to the models presented 
above. The full set of log-linearised equations appears in Appendix A. The 
approach to the optimal policy decision is to consider a second-order 
approximation of the welfare function around the efficient steady state. The 
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derivation of the loss function itself requires a second-order approximation of the 
utility function itself, but in the course of the derivation will actually require 
second-order approximations to some of the equations of the model. However, for 
many purposes, the first-order approximations are useful: the constraints in the 
optimisation problem need only be approximated to the first order; the optimality 
conditions for monetary policy – the ‘target criteria’ – are linear; and, the dynamics 
under the optimal policy can be analysed in the linearised model. 
With regard to notation, lower case letters refer to the log of the corresponding 
upper case letter less its deviation from steady state. 
If firms set the same price for home and foreign consumers, then 
*
tt s s =− . To a 
first order, 
*
tt s s =−  is assumed even if firms set different prices in the two 
countries. That is, for the aggregate price indices, 
**
FtH tF tH t p ppp −=−, so relative 
prices are the same in the home and foreign countries. This relationship will turn 
out to hold in the Calvo pricing model under LCP, when the frequency of price 
adjustment is identical in the two countries. 
The log of the deviation from the law of one price is defined as: 
  . (25) 
*
t t Ht Ht ep p Δ ≡+ −
Because 
*
tt s s =− , the deviation of the law of one price is the same for both goods: 
. 
*
t t Ft Ft ep p Δ ≡+ −
The market-clearing conditions, (18) and (19), are approximated as: 
 
* (2 ) 2
22 2
tt t ys c t c
ν νν ν − −
=+ + , (26) 
 
** (2 ) 2
22 2
tt t ys c t c
ν νν ν −− −
=+ + . (27) 
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The condition arising from complete markets that equates the marginal utility of 
nominal wealth for home and foreign households, Equation (22), is given by: 
  . (28) 
* (1 ) tt t cc σσ Δ ν −= + − t s
t c ,  , and 
*
t c t s  can be expressed in terms of  ,   and  t y
*
t y t Δ : 
 










+− − − −
=+ +  (29) 
 









+− − − −
=+ −  (30) 
 
* (1 )






=− − , (31) 
where  . 
2 (2 ) ( 1) D σν ν ν ≡− + −
The model is closed and solutions for the endogenous variables can be derived 
once policy rules are determined. I now turn to consideration of optimal monetary 
policy. 
4.  Loss Functions and Optimal Policy 
The loss function is derived for the cooperative monetary policy problem, which is 
the relevant criterion for evaluating world welfare. It is based on a second-order 
approximation to households’ utility functions. Loss is measured relative to the 
efficient allocations.  










− ∑ . (32) 
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This loss function is derived from household’s utility, given in Equation (1). The 
discount factor, β , is the household’s, and the per-period loss,  , represents the 
difference between the utility of the market-determined levels of consumption and 
leisure and the maximum utility achievable under efficient allocations. 
tj Χ +
The aim is to highlight the global inefficiency that arises from currency 
misalignments. For that reason, the difficult issues involved with deriving the loss 
function for a non-cooperative policy-maker and defining a non-cooperative policy 
game are set aside.  
It is worth noting for future work that there are three technical problems that arise 
in the case of non-cooperative policy. One problem is discussed in detail in 
Devereux and Engel (2003). To consider policies in the non-cooperative 
framework requires an examination of the effects of one country changing its 
policies, holding the other countries’ policies constant. In a complete markets 
world, to evaluate all possible alternative policies, it is necessary to calculate prices 
of state-contingent claims under alternative policies. In particular, Equation (22), 
which was derived assuming equal initial home and foreign wealth, cannot be 
assumed to hold under all alternative policies that the competitive policy-maker 
considers. Policies can change state-contingent prices and therefore change the 
wealth distribution. It is not uncommon for studies of optimal policy in open 
economies to treat Equation (22) as if it were independent of the policy choices, 
but it is not. There is a special case in which it holds in all states, which is the set-
up in CGG. When the law of one price holds, when home and foreign households 
have identical preferences and there are no preference shocks, and when 
preferences over home and foreign aggregates are Cobb-Douglas, Equation (22) 
holds in all states. This well-known outcome arises because in all states of the 
world, the terms of trade change in such a way as to leave home/foreign wealth 
unchanged. 
Even if this technical challenge could be overcome,17 there are a couple of other 
technical challenges that appear in this framework that did not plague CGG. First, 




t S = , that is, the relative price of 
foreign to home goods is not the same in both countries. This relationship holds up 
                                           
17 The Appendix of Devereux and Engel (2003) demonstrates how this problem can be handled 
(available at http://www.restud.com/uploads/suppmat/app0017.pdf). 
 18 
to a first-order log-linear approximation in the LCP model (as long as we assume 
equal speeds of price adjustment for all goods,18 but only up to a first-order 
approximation. Complex first-order relative price terms ( t s  and 
*
t s ) appear in the 
objective function of the non-cooperative policy-maker. However, those wash out 
in the objective function under cooperation. Second, CGG neatly dichotomise the 
choice variables in their model – the home policy-maker sets home PPI inflation 
and the home output gap taking the foreign policy choices as given, and vice versa 
for the foreign policy-maker. Such a neat dichotomy is not possible in the model 
with currency misalignments – we cannot just assign the exchange rate to one of 
the policy-makers.  
In a sense, all of these technical problems are related to the real world reason why 
it is more reasonable to examine policy in the cooperative framework when 
currency misalignments are possible. The non-cooperative model assumes that 
central banks are willing and able to manipulate currencies to achieve better 
outcomes. However, in practice both WTO rules and implicit rules of 
neighbourliness prohibit this type of policy. Major central banks have typically 
been unwilling to announce explicit targets for exchange rates without full 
cooperation of their partners.  
Even if the cooperative policy analysis is not a realistic description of actual policy 
decision-making, the welfare function is a measure of what could be achieved 
under cooperation. 
Appendix B shows the steps for deriving the loss function when there are no 
currency misalignments, but with home bias in preferences. It is worth pointing out 
one aspect of the derivation. In closed economy models with no investment or 
government, consumption equals output. That is an exact relationship, and 
therefore the deviation of consumption from the efficient level equals the deviation 
of output from the efficient level to any order of approximation:  . In the 
open economy, the relationship is not as simple. When preferences of home and 
foreign agents are identical, and markets are complete, then the consumption 
aggregates in home and foreign are always equal (up to a constant of 
proportionality equal to relative wealth). But that is not true when preferences are 
not the same. Equation 
t cy =  t
t (22) shows that 
*
t CC =  does not hold under complete 
                                           
18 See Benigno (2004) and Woodford (forthcoming) on this point. 
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markets, even if the law of one price holds for both goods. Because of this, 
*
tt cc +   
does not equal  , except to a first-order approximation. Since a second-order 
approximation of the utility function is being used, the effect of different 
preferences (or the effects of the terms of trade) needs to be taken into account 
when translating consumption gaps into output gaps. 
*
t yy +  t
The period loss of the policy-maker under no currency misalignments is  t Χ − , 
where: 
  () ()
*2 2 * 2 2 2
*
(2 ) ( 1)
()
42 2
tt t t t yy yy
D
νν σ σ σ φ ξ
Χσ
−− + ⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞ =− − + − ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟
⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠
  p t p t σ + .  (33) 
This depends on the squared output gap in each country, as well as the squared 
difference in the output gaps. The terms 
2
H p t σ  and 
F
2
* p t σ
t
 represent the cross-
sectional variance of prices of home goods and foreign goods, respectively. (Recall 
.) 
2 (2 ) ( 1) D σν ν ν ≡− + −
Appendix B also shows the derivation of the loss function in the more general case 
in which currency misalignments are possible. Two aspects of the derivation merit 
attention. First, in examining the first-order dynamics of the model, the first-order 
approximation 
*
t s s =−  can be used. That is an exact equation when the law of one 
price holds, but it is not necessary that this relationship hold to a second-order 
approximation. The derivation of the loss function must take this into account. The 
second point to note is that, as is standard in this class of models, price dispersion 
leads to inefficient use of labour. But, to a second-order approximation, this loss 
depends only on the cross-section variances of  Ht p , 
*
Ht p ,  Ft p , and 
*
Ft p , and not 
their co-movements (which would play a role in a third-order approximation.)  
In the case of currency misalignments,  t Χ  is given by: 
 
()
*2 2 * 2 2
22 2 2
**





22 2 2 2
HH F F
tt t t t
pt p t p t pt
yy yy
DD
νν σ σ σ φ ν ν
ΧΔ
ξν ν ν ν
σσ σ σ
−− + − ⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ =− − + − ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜
⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝






⎠  (34) 
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It is important to recognise that this loss function and the loss function derived 
previously (Equation (33)) do not depend on how prices are set – indeed whether 
prices are sticky or not. The loss function of Equation (34) generalises 
Equation (33) to the case in which there are deviations from the law of one price, 
so that  . This can be seen by directly comparing the two equations. In 
Equation 
0 t Δ ≠
(34), 
2
H p t σ  is the cross-sectional variance of home goods prices in the 
home country, 
2
* H p t σ  is the cross-sectional variance of home goods prices in the 
foreign country, etc. If there is no currency misalignment, then  , so  0 t Δ =
* () () Ht Ht t p fp f = e +  and 
* () () FtF t t p fp fe = +  for each firm f. In that case, 
22
* HH p tp σσ = t F  and 
22
* F p tp σσ = t  because the exchange rate does not affect the cross-
sectional variance of prices. If we have  0 t Δ = , 
22
* HH p tp σσ = t F , and 
22
* F p tp σσ = t , then 
(34) reduces to (33). 
Why does the currency misalignment appear in the loss function? That is, if both 
home and foreign output gaps are zero, and all inflation rates are zero, what 
problem does a misaligned currency cause?19 From Equation (31), if the currency 
is misaligned, then internal relative prices ( t s ) must also differ from their efficient 
level if the output gap is zero. The home and foreign countries could achieve full 
employment, but the distribution of the output between home and foreign 
households is inefficient. For example, suppose  0 t Δ > , which from Equation (31) 
implies   if both output gaps are eliminated. On the one hand,   tends to 
lead to overall consumption at home to be high relative to foreign consumption 
(Equations 
0 t s <  0 t Δ >
(29) and (30)). That occurs because financial markets make payments 
to home residents when their currency is weak. But home residents have a bias for 
home goods. That would lead to overproduction in the home country, were it not 
for relative price adjustments – which is why  0 t s <  .  
It is worth highlighting the fact that the loss functions are derived without specific 
assumptions about price setting not to give a false patina of generality to the result, 
but to emphasise that the loss in welfare arises not specifically from price 
stickiness but from prices that do not deliver the efficient allocations. Of course it 
is the specific assumptions of nominal price and wage setting that give rise to the 
internal and external price misalignments in this model, and indeed monetary 
                                           
19 Optimal inflation targets are zero in this model because we have assumed zero inflation in 
steady state. 
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policy would be ineffective if there were no nominal price or wage stickiness. But 
one could imagine a number of mechanisms that give rise to deviations from the 
law of one price, because the literature has produced a number of models based 
both on nominal stickiness and real factors. In the next section, the CGG model is 
modified in the simplest way – allowing LCP instead of PCP – to examine further 
the implications of currency misalignments. 
5.  Price and Wage Setting 
This section introduces the models of price and wage setting. Following CGG, 
wages are set flexibly by monopolistic suppliers of labour, but goods prices are 
sticky. 
Wages adjust continuously, but households exploit their monopoly power by 
setting a wage that incorporates a mark-up over their utility cost of work.  
Government is assumed to have only limited fiscal instruments. The government 
can set a constant output subsidy rate for monopolistic firms, which will achieve an 
efficient allocation in the non-stochastic steady state. But unfortunately, the mark-
up charged by workers is time-varying because the elasticity of demand for their 
labour services is assumed to follow a stochastic process. These shocks are 
sometimes labeled ‘cost-push’ shocks, and give rise to the well-known trade-off in 
CGG’s work between controlling inflation and achieving a zero output gap. 
Households are monopolistic suppliers of their unique form of labour services. 















t , (35) 
where 





tt WW h d h
η η − − = ∫ . (36) 
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The first-order condition for household h’s choice of labour supply is given by: 
 
()


















The optimal wage set by the household is a time-varying mark-up over the 
marginal disutility of work (expressed in consumption units).  
Because all households are identical,  () tt WW h =  and  () tt NN h = . 
Since all households are identical, Equation (37) implies: 
  . (38) 
1(/ 2 ) /( 1 )
W




Three different scenarios for firm behaviour are considered. In the first, prices can 
be adjusted freely. In the second – the PCP scenario that CGG analyse – firms set 
prices in their own country’s currency and face a Calvo pricing technology. In the 
third, when firms are allowed to change prices according to the Calvo pricing rule, 
they set a price in their own currency for sales in their own country and a price in 
the other country’s currency for exports. This is the LCP scenario. 
The following notation is adopted. For any variable  t Z : 
•  t Z   is the value under flexible prices. 
•  t Z  is the value of variables under globally efficient allocations. In other words, 
this is the value for variables if prices were flexible, and optimal subsidies to 
monopolistic suppliers of labour and monopolistic producers of goods were in 
place. This includes a time-varying subsidy to suppliers of labour to offset the 
time-varying mark-up in wages in Equation (37). 
•  t Z   is the gap: the value of the variable under PCP or LCP relative to  t Z  
We will treat the PCP and LCP cases separately, so there will be no need to use 
notation to distinguish variables under PCP versus LCP. 
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5.1  Flexible Prices 
Home firms maximise profits given by Equation (16), subject to the demand curve 
(10). They optimally set prices as a mark-up over marginal cost: 
  , where 
* () () ( 1 ) ( 1 ) /
P







When optimal subsidies are in place: 
 
* () () / Ht t Ht t t Pf E Pf WA == .   (40) 
From Equations (37), (39) and (40), it is apparent that the optimal subsidy satisfies  
  . (41)  (1 )(1 )(1 ) 1
PW
t τμ μ −+ += t
Note that from Equation (39) all flexible price firms are identical and set the same 
price. Because the demand functions of foreign residents have the same elasticity 




tH t H t E PP =   and 
* . tH t H t E PP =  (42) 
Equation (41), combined with Equation (38), implies: 
   and 
* /( ( 1 ) )
W
Ht t Ht t t PE PW A μ == +   *1 * * /( ( 1 ) )
W *
Ftt F tt t PE PW A μ
− == +   . (43) 





t S = 
t 
. (44) 
Because   is identical for all firms, Equation  ( ) Ht Pf  (23) collapses to  
  . (45)  tt YA N = 
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5.2  PCP 
A standard Calvo pricing technology is assumed. A given firm may reset its prices 
with probability 1 θ −  each period. Assume that when the firm resets its price, it 
will be able to reset its prices for sales in both markets. The PCP firm sets both 
prices in its own currency – that is, the home firm sets both   and 
 in home currency. (As will become apparent, the firm optimally 
chooses the same price for both markets,  .) 
() Ht Pf
** * () () Ht t Ht Pf E Pf ≡
** () () Ht Ht Pf Pf =
The firm’s objective is to maximise its value. Its value is equal to the value of its 
entire stream of dividends, valued at state-contingent prices. Given Equation (11), 
it is apparent that the firm that selects its prices at time t, chooses its reset prices, 
 and  , to maximise 
0 () Ht Pf
0**() Ht Pf
 
00 * * *
,
0
() () ()( 1 ) ()
j
t t t j Ht Ht j Ht Ht j t t j t j
j
E QP f Cf P Cf W N f θτ
∞
++ + + +
=
⎡ ⎤ +− − ⎣ ⎦ ∑ , (46) 
subject to the sequence of demand curves given by Equation (10) and the 
corresponding foreign demand equation for home goods. In this equation, define 
  ( ) , /( /
j




++ ≡ ) P + . (47) 
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Under the Calvo price-setting mechanism, a fraction θ  of prices remain unchanged 
from the previous period. From Equation (7), we can write: 
 
1/(1 ) 10 1
1 ()( 1 ) ( ) Ht Ht Ht PP P
ξ ξ θθ
ξ − −−




1/(1 ) ** 1 0 * 1
1 ()( 1 ) ( ) Ht Ht Ht PP P
ξ ξξ θθ
− −−
− ⎡ =+ − ⎣⎤ ⎦  (51) 
Taking Equations (48), (49), (50) and (51), it can be seen that the law of one price 
holds under PCP. That is,   for all f, hence  . Hence, 
under PCP we have  . 
* () () Ht t Ht Pf E Pf =
*




5.3  LCP 
The same environment as for the PCP case holds, with the sole exception that the 
firm sets its price for export in the importer’s currency rather than its own currency 
when it is allowed to reset prices. The home firm, for example, sets   in 
foreign currency. The firm that can reset its price at time t chooses its reset prices, 
 and  , to maximise 
* () Ht Pf






() ( ) ( ) ( 1 ) ( )
j
t t t j Ht Ht j t Ht Ht j t t j t j
j
E QP z Cf E P Cf W N f θτ
∞
++ + + +
=
⎡ ⎤ +− − ⎣ ⎦ ∑ . (52) 
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The solution for   is identical to Equation 
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Equations (50) and (51) hold in the LCP case as well. However, the law of one 
price does not hold.  
5.4  Subsidies 
As in CGG, assume that subsidies to monopolists are not set at their optimal level 
except in steady state. That is, instead of the efficient subsidy given in 
Equation (41), we have: 
  . (54)  (1 )(1 )(1 ) 1
PW τμ μ −+ + =
Here, 
W μ  is the steady-state level of 
W
t μ . The time subscript on the subsidy rate τ  
has been dropped because it is not time-varying. 
6.  Log-linearised Phillips Curves 
Under PCP, a New Keynesian Phillips curve for an open economy can be derived: 





(1 ) ( 1)
22





πδ φ β π +
⎡+ −⎤ ⎛⎞ =+ ++ ⎜⎟ ⎢⎥ ⎝⎠ ⎣⎦
 u + , (55) 
where 
W
tt u δμ = . 
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πδ φ β π +
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* * u + . (56) 
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
* * u + . (58) 
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Equations (57)–(58) and (59)–(60) imply that 
*
FtH tF tH t π πππ −=−. Assuming a 
symmetric initial condition, so that 
**
0000 F HFH p ppp −=−, leads to the conclusion 
that 
*
tt s s =−  as noted above. That is, the relative price of foreign to home goods is 
the same in both countries. It is worth emphasising that this is true in general for a 
first-order approximation. 
The efficient allocations cannot be obtained with monetary policy alone because of 
the sticky-price externality, and because the policy-maker is assumed to not have 
access to fiscal instruments aside from setting a constant subsidy rate to firms. 
The policy-maker has home and foreign nominal interest rates as instruments. As is 
standard in the literature, the policy-maker can be modelled as directly choosing 
output gaps, inflation levels, and (in the LCP case) deviations from the law of one 
price, subject to constraints. From the first-order conditions, the optimal choice of 
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nominal interest rates can be backed out using a log-linearised version of 
Equation (12) and its foreign counterpart, given by: 
  11 ( tt t t t t rE E c c ) π σ ++ −= − , (61) 
  . (62) 
** *
11 ( tt t t tt rE E c c πσ ++ −= −
* )
In these equations,  t π  and 
*



















=+ . (64) 
7.  Optimal Policy under PCP 
As is familiar in the New Keynesian models with Calvo price adjustment, the loss 






EE βΧ β Ψ
∞∞
t j + +
==
−= − ∑∑  
where: 
()
*2 2 *2 2 * 2 (2 ) ( 1)
() ( ( ) ( ) )( ) ( )
42 2
tt t t t H t yy y y
D
νν σ σ σ φ ξ
F t Ψ ππ
δ
−− + ⎛⎞ ∝− − + − ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
   + .(65) 
This loss function extends the one derived in CGG to the case of home bias in 
preferences, or non-traded goods (that is,  1 ν ≥  rather than  1 ν = ). 
The policy-maker chooses values for  ,  , t y 
*
t y  Ht π  and 
*
Ft π  to minimise the loss, 
subject to the Phillips curves (55) and (56). Under discretion, the policy-maker 
takes past values of  ,  , t y 
*
t y  Ht π  and 
*
Ft π  as given, and also does not make plans for 
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future values of these variables understanding that future incarnations of the 
policy-maker can alter any given plan. The policy-maker at time t cannot influence 
1 tH t Eπ +  and 
*
1 tF t Eπ +  because future inflation levels are chosen by future policy-
makers and there are no endogenous state variables that can limit the paths of 
future inflation levels. Hence, the policy-maker’s problem is essentially a static one 
– to maximise Equation (65) subject to Equations (55) and (56), taking  1 tH t Eπ +  and 
*
1 tF t Eπ +  as given. 
Even though home bias in consumption has been introduced, the optimal policy 
rules are the same as in CGG. The first-order conditions are given by: 
   (66) 
** () tt H tF t yyξπ π ++ + =  0 ,
0   . (67) 
** () tt H tF t yyξπ π −+ − = 
These two ‘target criteria’ can be rewritten as: 
  0 tH t y ξπ +=  , and 
** 0 tF t y ξπ + =  . (68) 
The criteria given in Equation (68) are identical to those that arise in the closed 
economy version of this model. There is a trade-off between the goals of 
eliminating the output gap and driving inflation to zero, and the elasticity of 
substitution among goods produced in the country determines the weights given to 
output gaps and inflation.  
It is worth emphasising that Equation (68) indicates the optimal policy entails a 
trade-off between the output gap and the producer price inflation level. In a closed 
economy with no intermediate goods, there is no distinction between producer and 
consumer prices. But in an open economy there is an important distinction. The 
policies described in Equation (68) imply that policy-makers should not give any 
weight to inflation of imported goods. In conjunction with the Phillips curves, (55) 
and (56), Equation (68) allows us to solve for the home and foreign output gaps 
and  Ht π  and 
*
Ft π  as functions of current and expected future cost-push shocks,   
and  . With the output gap determined by optimal policy, the terms of trade must 
adjust to ensure goods market clearing. But the terms of trade adjust freely in the 





price changes. In essence, the import sector is like a flexible-price sector, so 
policy-makers can ignore inflation in that sector, as in Aoki (2001). 
8.  Optimal Policy under LCP 
The transformed loss function,  t Ψ − , can be written as: 
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The loss function is similar to the one under PCP. The main point to highlight is 
that squared deviations from the law of one price matter for welfare, as well as 
output gaps and inflation rates. Deviations from the law of one price are 
distortionary and are a separate source of loss in the LCP model.  
The policy-maker under discretion seeks to minimise the loss subject to the 
constraints of the Phillips curves, (57)–(58) and (59)–(60). There is an additional 
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Using Equation (70) in conjunction with Equations (57) and (60), the following 
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This constraint arises in the LCP model but not in the PCP model, precisely 
because import prices are sticky and subject to a Calvo price adjustment 
mechanism, rather than free to respond via nominal exchange rate changes. 
Another contrast with the PCP model is that there are four sticky prices in the LCP 
model, so non-zero inflation rates for each of the four matter for welfare. Indeed, 
note that  t Ψ  can be rewritten as:  
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Under this formulation, the loss function is seen to depend on the aggregate CPI 
inflation rates,  t π  and 
*
t π , and the change in the terms of trade,  1 tt s s − − , rather than 
the four individual inflation rates given in Equation (69). This formulation is 
particularly useful when considering a simplification below, under which  1 tt s s − −  
is independent of policy. 
The LCP optimisation problem under discretion becomes very complex and 
difficult because of the additional constraint given by Equation (71). That is 
because there now are endogenous state variables – the choices of home output gap 
relative to the foreign output gap, and the deviation from the law of one price puts 
constraints on the evolution of future output gaps, inflation rates and deviations 
from the law of one price. In the LCP case, the dynamic game between current and 
future policy-makers is non-trivial. 
But inspection of Equation (71) reveals a special case in which the policy decision 
under uncertainty can be settled under the same simple conditions as in the PCP 
model. When  0 φ =  – utility is linear in labour – Equation (71) simplifies 
considerably. Indeed, it can be rewritten as: 
 
*
11 () tt t t t t tt s ss E s s u δβ −+ −= −+ − + −  u . (73) 
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With  0 φ = , we have 
* ( tttt tt ) s sss aa =−=− −  . So we can write (73) as a second-









δ βδ β δ
−+ =+ +





* () tt t t t aa uu s ϑ δδ =− + − =  . 
The point here is that Equation (74) determines the evolution of  t s  independent of 
policy choices. So while  t s  is a state variable, it is not endogenous for the policy-
maker. One nice thing about considering this special case is that the parameter φ  
does not appear in either the target criteria or the optimal interest rate rule in the 
CGG model, so the targeting and instrument rules under PCP can be compared 
directly to the LCP model. We also note that Devereux and Engel (2003) make the 
same assumption on preferences.  
The first-order conditions for the policy-maker can be derived independently of 
any assumption about the stochastic process for  t s . Equation (71) is replaced by 
Equation (31), expressed in ‘gap’ form, as a constraint on the choice of optimal 
values by the policy-maker.  
In fact, in this case the policy problem can be simplified further by using the 
version of the loss function given by Equation (72). A useful way to rewrite (72) 

























−− ⎛⎞ ∝− − ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
−+ + − −

 (75) 
where the R superscript represents home relative to foreign. That is, 
* R
tt t π ππ =−, 
, etc. Likewise, the W superscript refers to the sum of home and foreign 
variables: 
* R
tt t uu u =−
* W
tt t π ππ =+
* W
tt t uu u =+ ,  , etc. Since  1 tt s s − −  is independent of policy, 
the policy-maker’s problem can be expressed as choosing relative and world output 
gaps, 
R




t π  and 
W
t π , and the 
currency misalignment,   to maximise Equation  t Δ (75) subject to the ‘gap’ version 
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of Equation (31) and the linear combination of the Phillips curves that provide 
equations for CPI inflation in each country (which are derived here under the 
assumption that  0 φ = ): 
 
* (1 )






=− −    (76) 
  1
(1 ) ( 2)
(1 ) ,
R RR
tt t t t yE
DD
σν σ ν ν
πδ Δβ π ν +







   (78)  1 .
WW W
tt t t yE u πδ σ β π + =+ + 




tt y ξπ + =  . (79) 
This condition calls for a trade-off between the world output gap and the world 
inflation rate, just as in the PCP case. But there is a key difference – here in the 
LCP model, it is the CPI, not the PPI, inflation rates that enter into the policy-
maker’s trade-off. 







+ =  . (80) 
Here,   is the consumption real exchange rate, defined as:  t q
 
*
tt t qepp t = +− . (81) 
t q   is the deviation of the real exchange rate from its efficient level, where the 
following relationship has been used: 
 









=+  . (82) 
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Equation (80) represents the second of the target criteria as a trade-off between 
misaligned real exchange rates and relative CPI inflation rates. In the LCP model, 
where exchange rate misalignments are possible, Equation (82) highlights that 
optimal policy involves trading off relative output gaps, relative CPI inflation rates, 
and the currency misalignment. 
8.1  Optimal Policy under PCP versus LCP 
It is helpful to compare the target criteria under PCP (Conditions (66) and (67)) 
and LCP (Conditions (79) and (80)). 
First, compare Equation (66) to (79). Both involve a trade-off between the world 
output gap and world inflation. But under PCP, producer price inflation appears in 
the trade-off. However, world producer price inflation is equal to world consumer 









π ππ ππ π
−−
=+ ++ = + π . (83) 
The second equality holds because the relative prices are equal in home and 
foreign under PCP (and, for that matter, to a first-order approximation under LCP) 
so 
**
Ht Ft Ht Ft π πππ =+−. 
This trade-off is the exact analogy to the closed economy trade-off between the 
output gap and inflation, and the intuition of that trade-off is well understood. On 
the one hand, with asynchronised price setting, inflation leads to misalignment of 
relative prices, so any non-zero level of inflation is distortionary. On the other 
hand, because the monopoly power of labour is time-varying due to the time-
varying elasticity of labour demand, output levels can be inefficiently low or high 
even when inflation is zero. Conditions (66) or (79) describe the terms of that 
trade-off. Inflation is more costly the higher is the elasticity of substitution among 
varieties of goods, ξ , because a higher elasticity will imply greater resource 
misallocation when there is inflation. 
The difference in optimal policy under PCP versus LCP comes in the comparison 
of Condition (67) with (80). Under PCP, optimal policy trades off home relative to 
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foreign output gaps with home relative to foreign PPI inflation. Under LCP, the 
trade-off is between the real exchange rate and home relative to foreign CPI 
inflation. 
First, it is helpful to consider Equation (80) when the two economies are closed, so 
that 2 ν = . Using (82), under this condition,  1 D = , and (80) reduces to 
. Of course, when  0
RR
tt y ξπ +=  2 ν = , there is no difference between PPI and CPI 
inflation, and so in this special case the optimal policies under LCP and PCP are 
identical. That is nothing more than reassuring, since the distinction between PCP 
and LCP should not matter when the economies are closed. 
When 2 ν ≠ , understanding these conditions is more subtle. It helps to consider the 
case of no home bias in preferences, so  1 ν = . Imagine that inflation rates were 
zero, so that there is no misallocation of labour within each country. Further, 
imagine that the world output gap is zero. There are still two possible distortions. 
First, relative home to foreign output may not be at the efficient level. Second, 
even if output levels are efficient, the allocation of output to home and foreign 
households may be inefficient if there are currency misalignments. 
When 1 ν = , it follows from Equations (26) and (27) that relative output levels are 
determined only by the terms of trade. We have 
R
t y t s =  . On the other hand, from 
Equation  (28) when  1 ν = , relative consumption is misaligned when there are 
currency misalignments, 
1 R
t c t Δ
σ
=  . Moreover, when  1 ν = , the deviation of the 
real exchange rate from its inefficient level is entirely due to the currency 
misalignment:  .  tt q Δ = 
Under PCP, the law of one price holds continuously, so there is no currency 
misalignment. In that case,  , and relative home to foreign consumption is 
efficient. In that case, policy can influence the terms of trade in order to achieve 
the optimal trade-off between relative output gaps and relative inflation, as 
expressed in Equation 
0 t Δ =
(67). Policy can control the terms of trade under PCP 
because the terms of trade can adjust instantaneously and completely through 
nominal exchange rate adjustment. That is, 
*
tF tH t tF t s H t ppe pp =−= +−. While 
*
Ft p  and  Ht p  do not adjust freely, movements in the nominal exchange rate   are 
unrestricted, so the terms of trade adjust freely.  
t e
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Under LCP, the nominal exchange rate does not directly influence the consumer 
prices of home to foreign goods in either country. For example, in the home 
country,  tF tH t s pp =−. Because prices are set in local currencies, neither  Ft p  and 
Ht p  adjust freely to shocks. In fact, as I have shown, when utility is linear in labour 
( 0 φ = ) monetary policy has no control over the internal relative prices. 
But under LCP, there are currency misalignments, and monetary policy can 
influence those. Recall from (25)  , so the currency 
misalignment can adjust instantaneously with nominal exchange rate movements. 
Because policy cannot influence the relative output distortion (when 
*
t t Ht Ht t Ft Ft ep p ep p Δ ≡+ − =+ −
*
1 ν = ) but can 
influence the relative consumption distortion, the optimal policy puts full weight 






+= . When  , so that the home currency is undervalued, and 
, so home CPI inflation exceeds foreign, the implications for policy are 
obvious. Home monetary policy must tighten relative to foreign. But the more 
interesting case to consider is when home inflation is running high, so that 
, but the currency is overvalued, so that 
0 t Δ >
* 0 tt ππ −>
* 0 tt ππ −> 0 t Δ < . Then Equation (80) 
implies that the goals of maintaining low inflation and a correctly valued currency 
are in conflict. Policies that improve the inflation situation may exacerbate the 
currency misalignment (implying an even larger correction of e at some future 
date). Equation (80) parameterises the trade-off. 
9.  The Interest Rate Reaction Functions 
An interest rate rule that will support the optimal policies given by Equations (79) 
and (80) can be derived.  
Substituting Equation (80) into Equations (57)–(58) and (59)–(60), and using the 


















Assuming that   and   are each AR(1) processes, independently distributed, with 




ρ. Under these assumptions, Equation (84) 









































t  (87) 
Substituting these equations into the Euler equations for the home and foreign 
country, given by Equations (61) and (62), making use of the consumption 
Equations (29) and (30), it can be shown that: 
  1
(1 )
(( 1) ) ( ) (( 1) )
R RR R R





ρρ σ ξ π ρρ σ ξ π +
−
=+ − + − =+ − +, (88) 
  1 (( 1) ) ( ) (( 1) )
W WW W W
t tt t t t rE y y ρρ σ ξ π σ ρρ σ ξ π + =+ − + − =+ − +
W
t r r . (89) 
Here,  t rr  represents the real interest rate in the efficient economy. Equations (88) 
and (89) can be used to write: 
  (( 1) ) t t r ρρ σ ξ π =+ − +, t r r  (90) 
 
* * (( 1) ) t t r ρρ σ ξ π =+ − +
*
t r r
                                          
. (91) 
 
20 See Appendix B for the complete solutions of the model under optimal policy. 
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Surprisingly, these interest rate reaction functions are identical to the ones derived 
in CGG for the PCP model, except that the inflation term that appears on the right-
hand side of each equation is CPI inflation here, while it is PPI inflation in CGG. 
This finding starkly highlights the difference between monetary rules expressed as 
‘target criteria’ (or targeting rules) and monetary rules expressed as interest rate 
reaction functions (or instrument rules). The optimal interest rate reaction functions 
presented in Equations (90) and (91) appear to give no role for using monetary 
policy to respond to deviations from the law of one price. However, the ‘target 
criteria’ show the optimal trade-off does give weight to the law of one price 
deviation. The key to understanding this apparent conflict is that the reaction 
functions, such as (90) and (91) are not only setting inflation rates. By setting 
home relative to foreign interest rates, they are also prescribing a relationship 
between home and foreign output gaps, the law of one price deviation, and home 
relative to foreign inflation rates. 
If central bankers really did mechanically follow an interest rate rule, their optimal 
policy rules would have the nominal interest rate responding only to CPI inflation. 
In practice, however, central bankers set the interest rates to achieve their targets. 
We have shown that the optimal target criteria involves trade-offs among the goals 
of achieving zero inflation, driving the output gaps to zero, and eliminating the law 
of one price gap. 
The optimal policy indeed is not successful in eliminating the currency 
misalignment. Nor does policy drive inflation to zero or eliminate the output gap. 
Monetary policy-makers do not have sufficient control over the economy to 
achieve the efficient outcome. Appendix B.4 displays the solutions for inflation, 
the output gap, and the currency misalignment under optimal policy. 
10.  Conclusions 
Policy-makers do not in general adhere to simple interest rate reaction functions. 
Instead, as Svensson (1999, 2002) has argued, they set targets for key economic 
variables. It has generally been believed, especially in light of CGG, that the key 
trade-offs in an open economy are the same as in a closed economy. That is, 
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policy-makers should target a linear combination of inflation and the output gap. 
This paper shows that in fact, with a model that is rich enough to allow for 
currency misalignments, the trade-offs should involve not only inflation and the 
output gap but also the exchange rate misalignment. However, the interest rate 
reaction function that supports this policy has the nominal interest rate reacting 
only to CPI inflation. 
The paper derives the policy-maker’s loss function when there is home bias in 
consumption and deviations from the law of one price. The loss function does 
depend on the structure of the model, of course, but not on the specific nature of 
price setting. Currency misalignments may arise in some approaches for reasons 
other than LCP. For example, there may be nominal wage stickiness but imperfect 
pass-through that arises from strategic behaviour by firms as in the models of 
Atkeson and Burstein (2007, 2008) or Corsetti et al (forthcoming). Future work 
can still make use of the loss function derived here, or at least of the steps used in 
deriving the loss function.  
The objective of this paper is to introduce LCP into a familiar and popular 
framework for monetary policy analysis. But the CGG model does not produce 
empirical outcomes that are especially plausible, even with the addition of LCP. In 
the model, if output gaps are eliminated, the reason a currency misalignment is 
inefficient is because consumption goods are misallocated between home and 
foreign households. In a richer framework, even with LCP as the source of 
currency misalignments, there are other potential misallocations that can occur 
when exchange rates are out of line. For example, an overvalued currency would 
lead to a movement in resources away from the traded sector to the non-traded 
sector. Or if countries import oil from the outside, a misaligned currency affects 
the real cost of oil in one importing country relative to the other.  
Future work should also consider the difficult issue of policy-making in this 
environment when there is not cooperation. A separate but related issue is a closer 
examination of who bears the burden of currency misalignments. If a currency is 
overvalued, does it hurt consumers in one country more than another, both under 
optimal and sub-optimal policy?  
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While rich models that can be estimated and analysed numerically offer valuable 
insights, they seem to provide inadequate guidance to policy-makers for how they 
should react to exchange rate movements. Perhaps more basic work on simple 
models such as the one presented here, in concert with quantitative exploration of 
more detailed models, can be productive. 
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Appendix A: Log-linearised Model 
The log-linear approximations to the models presented above are presented in this 
Appendix. 
Use is made of the first-order approximation 
*
tt s s = − , as explained in the text. That 
relationship is obvious in the flexible-price and PCP models, but will require some 
explanation in the LCP case. That explanation is postponed until later. 
In this Appendix, all of the equations of the log-linearised model are presented, but 
those that are used in the derivation of the loss function (which do not involve 
price setting or wage setting) are separated from those that are not. 
Equations used for derivation of loss functions 
The log of the deviation from the law of one price is defined as: 
   (A1) 
*
t t Ht Ht ep p Δ ≡+ −
In the flexible-price and PCP models,  0 t Δ = . In the LCP model, because 
*
tt s s = − , 
the law of one price deviation is the same for both goods:  . 
*
t t Ft Ft ep p Δ ≡+ −
In all three models, to a first order, 
** ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) 0 Ht Ht Ft Ft VVVV = ===
t
. That 
allows Equation (23) and its foreign counterpart to be approximated as: 





t = − . (A3) 
The market-clearing conditions, (18) and (19) are approximated as: 
 
* (2 ) 2
22 2
tt t ys c t c
ν νν ν − −
=+ + , (A4) 
 
** (2 ) 2
22 2
tt t ys c t c
ν νν ν −− −
=+ + . (A5) 
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The condition arising from complete markets that equates the marginal utility of 
nominal wealth for home and foreign households, Equation (22), is given by: 
  . (A6) 
* (1 ) tt t cc σσ Δ ν −= + − t s
For use later, it is helpful to use Equations (A4)–(A6) to express  ,  ,  t c
*
t c t s , in 
terms of   and   and the exogenous disturbances,  ,  ,  t y
*




t μ , and 
*W
t μ : 
 











+− − − −
=+ + (A7) 
 










+− − − −
=+ −  (A8) 
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=− − , (A9) 
where  . 
2 (2 ) ( 1) D σν ν ν ≡− + −
Under a globally efficient allocation, the marginal rate of substitution between 
leisure and aggregate consumption should equal the marginal product of labour 
times the price of output relative to consumption prices. To see the derivation more 




F t  into Equations (A10) and (A11) below. So, the efficient allocation would 
be achieved in a model with flexible wages and optimal subsidies. These equations 
then can be understood intuitively by looking at the wage-setting equations below 
(Equations (A14)–(A15), and (A16)–(A17)) assuming the optimal subsidy is in 
place. But they do not depend on a particular model of wage setting, and are just 
the standard efficiency condition equating the marginal rate of substitution 
between leisure and aggregate consumption to the marginal rate of transformation.  
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Equations of wage and price setting 
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t wp −  and   can be expressed in terms of   and   and the exogenous 
disturbances,  ,  , 
*





t a μ , and 
*W
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+− − − ⎛⎞ −= + + + −+ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
. (A15) 
A.1 Flexible  Prices 
The values of all the real variables under flexible prices can be solved by using 
Equations (A2), (A3), (A7), (A8), (A9), (A14) and (A15), as well as the price-
setting conditions, from (43): 
  tH t wp a t − =  , (A16) 
 
**
tF t wp a
*
t − =  . (A17) 
A.2 PCP 
Log-linearisation of Equations (49) and (50) leads to the familiar New Keynesian 
Phillips curve for an open economy: 
  1 () Ht t Ht t t Ht wp a E π δβ π + =− − + , (A18) 
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where (1 )(1 ) / δ θβ θ =− − θ . 
This equation can be rewritten as: 
  1 () Htt H tt wp E H t π δβ π + =− +  , 




(1 ) ( 1)
22





πδ φ β π +
⎡+ −⎤ ⎛⎞ =+ ++ ⎜⎟ ⎢⎥ ⎝⎠ ⎣⎦
 u + , (A19) 
where 
W
tt u δμ = . 




(1 ) ( 1)
22





πδ φ β π +
⎡+ − ⎤ ⎛⎞ =+ + + ⎜⎟ ⎢⎥ ⎝⎠ ⎣⎦

* * u + . (A20) 
A.3 LCP 
Equation (A18) holds in the LCP model as well. But in the LCP model, the law of 
one price deviation is not zero. It follows that: 
     
*
1
(1 ) ( 1) ( 1)
22 2





πδ φ Δβ π +
⎡+ − − − ⎤ ⎛⎞ =+ + + + ⎜⎟ ⎢⎥ ⎝⎠ ⎣⎦
 u + , (A21) 
     
**
1
(1 ) ( 1) 1
22 2





πδ φ Δβ π +
⎡+ − − −⎤ ⎛⎞ =+ + + + ⎜⎟ ⎢⎥ ⎝⎠ ⎣⎦

* * u +
* .
. (A22) 
In addition, Equations (18) and (51) imply: 
 
** *
11 () () Ht t Ht t t t Ht t Ht t t t Ht wp ea E wp a E πδ β π δ Δ β π + + =− − − + =− − − +  (A23) 
This can be rewritten as 
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**
1
(1 ) ( 1) 1
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πδ φ Δβ π +
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From Equations (A7)–(A8) and (A14)–(A15), it can be seen that 
*
FtH tF tH t π πππ −=−
*
tt
. Assuming a symmetric initial condition leads to the 
conclusion that s s =−  as noted above. That is, the relative price of foreign to 
home goods is the same in both countries. I emphasise that this is true in general 
for a first-order approximation. 
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Appendix B: Welfare Functions and Other Derivations 
B.1  Derivation of Welfare Function in Clarida-Galí-Gertler Model with 
Home Bias in Preferences 
The object is to rewrite the welfare function, which is defined in terms of home 
and foreign consumption and labour effort, into terms of the squared output gap 
and squared inflation. The joint welfare function of home and foreign households 
is derived, since cooperative monetary policy is being examined. 
Most of the derivation requires only first-order approximations of the equations of 
the model, but in a few places, second-order approximations are needed. If the 
approximation is first-order, the notation ‘ ( )
2 oa + ’ is used to indicate that there 
are second-order and higher terms left out, and if the approximation is second-
order, ‘ ( )
3 oa + ’ is used. (a is notation for the log of the productivity shock.) 
From Equation (1) in the text, the period utility of the planner is given by: 
 
1* 1 1* 1 11
() (
11









Take a second-order log approximation around the non-stochastic steady state. 
Allocations are assumed to be efficient in steady state, so 
1* 11* CC NN
σ σ φφ −− + == =
+ 1 . The fact that 
1 CN
σφ − + =  follows from the fact that in 
steady state C  from market clearing and symmetry, and  N = CN
σφ − =  from the 
condition that the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption 
equals one in an efficient non-stochastic steady state.  










































Since maximising an affine transformation of Equation (B2) is equivalent, it is 
convenient to simplify that equation to get: 
  ()() ( )
** 2 * 2 2 * 2 11
22




=+−−+ + − + + . (B3) 
Utility is maximised when consumption and employment take on their efficient 
values: 
  () () (
max * * 2 *2 2 *2 3 11
22




=+ −− + + − + + . (B4) 
In general, this maximum may not be attainable because of distortions. Writing 
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 (B6) 
The object is to write (B6) as a function of squared output gaps and squared 




t + −−   is needed. 
But for the rest of the terms, since they are squares and products, the first-order 
approximations that have already been derived will be sufficient.  
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Recalling that   in the PCP model, Equations (A7)–(A8) can be written as:  0 t Δ =
  ( )
* (1 ) ty t y t cc y c yo a =+ − +
2 , (B7) 
  ( )
** (1 ) ty t y t cc y c y o a =− + +










It follows from (B7) and (B8) that: 
  ( )
* (1 ) ty t y t cc y c yo a =+ − +
2 , (B9) 
  ( )
** (1 ) ty t y t cc y c y o a =− + +
2 , (B10) 
  ( )
* (1 ) ty t y t cc y c yo a =+ − +  
2 , (B11) 
  ( )
** (1 ) ty t y t cc y c y o a =− + +  
2 . (B12) 
Next, it is easy to show that: 
  ( )
2
tt nyo a =+  ,   and  (B13) 
  ( )
** 2
tt nyo a =+  . (B14) 
These follow as in Equations (A2)–(A3) because  (
2
ttt nyao a =−+ )  and 
tt nya =− t  (and similarly in the foreign country).  
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Expressions for  t n  and 
*
t n  are required. From Equations (A10)–(A11): 
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t , these can be written as 
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* 12 1
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12 1 2
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2 o a , and (B15) 
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** 12 1
(1 ) ( 1)
12 1 2




−− − ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ =− ++ − + + ⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ++ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ )
2 o a . (B16) 
Turning attention back to the loss function in Equation (B6), focus first on the 
terms  ()() () ()
2* 2 2* 2 * * * * 11
(1 ) (1 )
22




+− ++ − + − + +       . 
As noted above, these involve only squares and cross-products of  ,  ,  t c 
*
t c  t c , 
*




t n  t n , and 
*
t n . Equations (B9)–(B16) can be substituted into this expression. It is 
useful to provide a few lines of algebra since it is a bit messy: 
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Now return to the   term in Equation 
*
tt t ccnn +−−  (B6) and conduct a second-
order approximation. Start with Equation (18), dropping the   term because it 
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Then use Equation (22), but using the fact that 
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− =  and there are no deviations 








= .   (B19) 





tt t t YS C S
νν ν
σ γν
− − + − ⎛⎞ =+ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
t C . (B20) 
 51 









+ ⎛⎞ − ⎛⎞ =+ ⎜ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ⎝⎠







tt cy e e
νν
σ νν
−− ⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞ + ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟
⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎛⎞ − ⎛⎞ =− + ⎜ ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
ν
⎟ ⎟ . (B22) 









































Then this second-order approximation is obtained: 
(
2
22 21 1 2 1
(1 )
22 2 2
tt t t cy s so a
νν ν ν σ
νν
σσ
−− − − ⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ =+ + + − + ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜⎟ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ )




** 2 2 3 21 1 2 1
(1 )
22 2 2
tt t t cy s so a
νν ν ν σ
νν
σσ
−− − − ⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ =− + + − + ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜⎟ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ )
t
. (B26) 
Since only   is of interest, these can be added together to get:  
*
t cc + 
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2
** 2 2 21
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Now take a first-order approximation for  t s  to substitute out for 
2
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Substituting into Equation (B28) leads to: 
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where 
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Evaluating (B29) at flexible prices: 
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It follows from the fact that 
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See Section B.3 below for the second-order approximations for   and  :  t n 
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Some tedious algebra demonstrates that  
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   (B36) 
This expression reduces to CGG’s when there is no home bias ( 1 γ = ). To see this 
from their expression at the top of p 903, multiply their utility by 2 (since they take 
average utility), and set their γ  equal to ½ (so their country sizes are equal). 
B.2  Derivation of Welfare Function under LCP with Home Bias in 
Preferences 
The second-order approximation to welfare in terms of logs of consumption and 
employment of course does not change, so Equation (B6) still holds. As before, the 
derivation is broken down into two parts. First-order approximations to structural 
equations are used to derive an approximation to the quadratic term  
  ()() () ()
2* 2 2* 2 * * * * 11
(1 ) (1 )
22
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Then second-order approximations to the structural equations are used to derive an 
expression for  . 
**
tt t ccnn +−−  t
The quadratic term involves squares and cross-products of  ,  ,  t c 
*
t c  t c , 
*
t c ,  ,  ,  t n 
*
t n 
t n , and 
*
t n . Expressions (B9)–(B10) still provide first-order approximations for 
t c and 
*





(B15)–(B16) are first-order approximations for  t n  and 
*
t n . But 
Equations (A7)–(A8) and (B11)–(B12) are required to derive: 









=+ − + +   , (B37) 










=− + − +   . (B38) 
With these equations, the derivation as in Equation (B17) can be followed. After 
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involves output levels, not output gaps. That is: 
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The derivation of   is similar to the PCP model. However, one 
tedious aspect of the derivation is that the equality 
*
tt t ccnn +−− 
*
tt SS
− = , that holds under PCP 
and flexible prices, cannot be used. The equilibrium conditions are expressed for 
home output, and its foreign equivalent, from Equations (18) and (19): 
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Directly taking second-order approximations of these equations around the 
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Note that in a second-order approximation, 
*
t s s = −  cannot be imposed. However, 
2*
tt
2 s s =  can be imposed. Then adding Equations (B42) and (B43) together, leads 
to: 
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t s . These equations are linear approximations for  ,   and  t c
*
t c t s , but since the 
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goal is to approximate the squares of these variables, that is sufficient. With some 
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Note that if  , Equation  0 t Δ = (B46) leads to the second-order approximation for 
 from the PCP model. 
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Then following the derivations as in the PCP model derivation of Equation (B31), 
it follows that: 
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As shown in Section B.3, the following second-order approximation can be made: 
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Equation (B47) and (B48), along with Equation (B39), can be substituted into the 
loss function (B6). Notice the cancellations that occur. The cross-product terms on 
 in Equations 
* ( tt t yy Δ − ) (B39) and (B47) cancel. The other cross-product terms 
involving output gaps and efficient levels of output also cancel, just as in the PCP 
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B.3  Derivations of Price Dispersion Terms in Loss Functions 
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Following Galí (2008), note that 
  (
2
ˆ (1 ) ( ) 2 (1 ) ˆˆ 1( 1 ) () ()
2
Ht pf




=+ − + + )
3 o a . (B53) 
By the definition of the price index  Ht P , 
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It is also the case that 
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It follows, using (B54): 
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Note the following relationship: 
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Using our notation for variances, 
2 var( )
H p tH t p σ ≡ , and taking the log of (B56) leads 
to 
  ( )
2
2
H tp t vo
3 a
ξ
σ =+ . (B58) 
Substituting this into Equation (B51), and recalling that  tt yna =+ t , implies 
Equation (B32). The derivation of Equation (B33) for the foreign country proceeds 
identically. 
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For the LCP model, the following second-order approximation to the equation 
 is used: 
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In the LCP model, it is possible to write: 
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where the definitions of  Ht V  and   are analogous to that of   in the PCP model. 
Taking a second-order log approximation to the Expression 
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The same steps as in the PCP model can be followed to conclude: 
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Following analogous steps for the foreign country, 
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Adding Equations (B66) and (B67) gives Equation (B48). 
Finally, to derive the loss functions for policy-makers (Equation (65) for the PCP 
model and (69) for the LCP model), note that the loss function is the present 
expected discounted value of the period loss functions derived here 
(Equation (B36) for the PCP model and (B49) for the LCP model). That is, the 












Following Woodford (2003, Chapter 6), it can be seen that, in the PCP model, if 
prices are adjusted according to the Calvo price mechanism given by Equation (50) 
for  Ht P , then 
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Analogous relationships hold for 
*
Ft P  in the PCP model, and for  Ht P , 
*
Ft P ,  Ft P , and 
 in the LCP model. This relationship can then be substituted into the present 
value loss function,  , to derive the loss functions of the two 













−− ∑ ) j
a t
B.4  Solutions for Endogenous Variables under Optimal Policy Rules 
Assume that shocks follow the processes (where the W superscript on the wage 
mark-up shocks have been dropped): 
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The solutions for the variables that appear in the loss function under the optimal 
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